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NOTES
such a recognition of the similarity in these types of action
should be carried to its logical and just conclusion.
In the case where Smith wishes to reduce to judgment a con-
tract right against an absentee, Jones, the only objections, it
seems, are formal ones. As much justice can be effected, at
least, as in the transient motorist cases. In both instances, the
defendant is sought to be subjected to civil liability, and the
grounds for distingushing them are doubtful. Perhaps the
automobile is regarded as a dangerous instrumentality; but that,
it seems, might be a basis for criminal jurisdiction. Where the
plaintiff seeks money damages, what better position is he in
there than if his right were in contract?
In conclusion, we think that judgments in rem, at least in some
cases, ought to be recognized as vestigial remnants of medieval
times, of a time when symbolism was permitted to obstruct the
course of justice. We venture to suggest that our times are be-
yond such formal impediments and that our judges are capable
of looking at the interests of the people involved as the final
object of any legal decree. Judgments in personcm and in rem
should be recognized to be mere formulae, to some degree, at any
rate. They are the exteriors of the forms of action which have
grown up in our system of jurisprudence, and they should not be
allowed to obstruct the path of justice. People, their rights of
user in things, and their relationships toward each other are the
things which a lawsuit actually controls. The adjudication of
these things should not be interfered with by formulary
procedure.
MORRIS E. COHN, '29.
WHEN IS A PARTNERSHIP INSOLVENT WITHIN THE
TERMS OF THE PRESENT BANKRUPTCY ACT SO
AS TO BE ADJUDGED BANKRUPT?
May a partnership be insolvent under the present Bankruptcy
Act, when one of the partners is totally solvent i. e., is able to
pay his individual debts as well as all of the firm debts? This
question is one which many students of jurisprudence consider
settled in the negative. However, after a survey of the authori-
ties on the subject, a great conflict presents itself.
Before entering a discussion of this sort, it would be well to
draw the distinction between the terms "insolvent" and "bank-
rupt." The term "insolvent" is defined in the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, as follows: "A person shall be deemed insolvent within
the provisions of this title whenever the aggregate of his prop-
erty, exclusive of any property which he may have conveyed,
transferred, concealed, or removed, or permitted to be concealed
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or removed, with intent to defraud, hinder, or delay his cred-
itors, shall not at a fair valuation, be sufficient in amount to pay
his debts."' "Bankrupt" is defined in the same Act: "'Bank-
rupt' shall include a person against whom an involuntary peti-
tion or an application to set composition aside or to revoke a dis-
charge has been filed, or who has filed a voluntary petition, or
who has been adjudged a bankrupt." 2 The Act includes part-
nerships in the term "person," 3 hence this terminology will give
no difficulty.
Of course the primary question to be considered is whether the
partnership is an entity in bankruptcy. If it is a complete en-
tity, then the question as to insolvency should be answered in the
affirmative. If it is not an entity it cannot be held to be in-
solvent so long as its own assets, plus those of the partners, are
sufficient to pay its debts. The Supreme Court of the United
States in Liberty National Bank v. Bear' settled a thirty year
conflict raging in the District and Circuit Courts by laying down
the proposition that a partnership could be adjudged a bankrupt
irrespective of the adjudication of the partners. On the face of
this decision it would seem that a partnership is an absolute en-
tity and may be insolvent even though there is a partner who
can pay his own debts as well as those of the firm. However,
the common law conception of a partnership with the conse-
quent individual liability of partner, is so firmly established in
English and American Jurisprudence that it takes more than
one case to overturn it; and, indeed, the Liberty National Bank
case did not deny the partners' liability;. It simply held that
their assets, if necessary, but not they themselves, were drawn
into bankruptcy by the adjudication of the partnership.
One of the earliest cases dealing with the subject of insolvency
of a partnership is Vaccaro v. Security Bank of Memphis.6 This
case was decided merely two years after the passage of the Bank-
ruptoy Act and has been cited and approved innumerable times.
The case deals with the firm of A. Vaccaro and Company com-
posed of A. Vaccaro, B. Vaccaro and A. B. Vaccaro. A. Vac-
caro, a wealthy man died, and the two survivors carried on the
business. A petition in bankruptcy was filed against the firm,
'11 U. S. C., Sec. 1, Art. 15.
211 U. S. C., Sec. 1, Art. 4.
'11 U. S. C., Sec. 1, Art. 19.
' (1928), 48 S. Ct. 252; 72 L. Ed. (Adv.) 255. For the effect of Liberty
National Bank v. Bear, see note by writer in 14 ST. Louis L. REV. 57.
(1900), 103 F. 436. Other cases in accord with the holding in this case
are: Davis v. Stevens (1900), 104 F. 235; Lancing Boiler and Engine
Works v. Reyerson (1904), 128 F. 701; In re Samuels (1914), 215 F. 845;
In re Kobre (1915), 224 F. 106; In re Griffith (1922), 280 F. 878; In re
Russel et al (1926), 13 F (2d) 928.
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and the defense was that the estate of the deceased partner was
solvent and sufficient to pay all its individual debts as well as all of
the firm debts. The defense was held good and the petition was dis-
missed. The court held that a firm could not be insolvent unless all
of its members were also insolvent, on the ground that each part-
ner is liable in solido for firm debts, and where there is a partner
whose assets are sufficient to pay his private debts as well as firm
debts, there is no insolvency under a law which defines in-
solvency as does the bankruptcy act, supra. The court substan-
tiates its decision by finding similarities between the Federal
Bankruptcy Act and the Massachusetts Act of 1838, and by cit-
ing old Massachusetts cases under the latter act announcing the
same rule. The court did not decide whether or not the part-
nership was an entity under the Federal Act of 1898.
The case of In re Forbes" is in line with Vacarro v. Bank,
supra. Lowell J., says: "So far as I know, the discharge of a
partnership as an entity has never been suggested." The deci-
sion is clearly based on this non-entity theory.
The next step in favor of the traditional view is found in the
case of In re Perley and Hays.7  In this case an involuntary pe-
tition was filed against a firm which was insolvent as an entity,
but which had one solvent partner. The debt of the petitioner
was $3320.00, while the assets of the firm plus the assets of the
partner amounted to $6300.00. The court held the firm to be
solvent, relying on Vaccaro v. Bank and Davis v. Stevens, supra.
The court recognizes the entity theory but makes no attempt to
reconcile it to the decisions. Other cases recognizing the entity
theory, but following Vaccaro v. Bank, will be found in the foot-
note.8
Coming to the other side of the question, we have an early
case, In re McMurtrey and Smith,9 in which the petitioners al-
leged a preference. The defense was the solvency of one of the
partners. The court overruled the defense and adjudicated the
firm. The court recognized the existence of the firm entity
under the Federal Bankruptcy Act of 1898,10 and based its de-
cision on this entity theory.
A case which is often cited in this connection is In re Berten-
shaw.11 The facts of this case are simple. The Opera House
Drug Company, a partnership composed of B. F. Masterman,
'(1904), 128 F. 137.(1905), 138 F. 927.
'In re Perlhefter (1910), 177 F. 299; In re Hensley and Adams (1916),
228 F. 564.(1905), 142 F. 853.
11 U. S. C. Secs. 1-110.
(1907), 157 F. 363. Other cases in accord with the holding in this case
are: In re Everybody's Market (1908), 173 F. 492; In re Salamon and
Carvel (1908), 163 F. 140; Meek v. Beezer (1928), 28 F. (2d) 343.
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C. C. Surber, and Charles Joyce, was adjudicated bankrupt.
None of the partners were found to be insolvent nor were any of
them adjudicated bankrupt. The firm assets were insufficient
to pay firm debts, whereupon the trustee filed a petition for an
order to have certain individually owned real estate of C. C.
Surber applied to firm debts. Surber objected on the ground that
the separate real estate of an unadjudicated partner could not be
administered by the trustee of the bankrupt firm. The referee
upheld Surber's contention. He was affirmed by the District
Court and by the Circuit Court of Appeals in the principal case.
The case has been overruled as regards the inability of a trustee
in bankrupty to reach individual assets, but its importance for
the purposes of this discussion lies in a very strong dictum on
the question of partnership entity. The court recognizes the
line of authority which follows Vaccaro v. Bank, supra, in its
argument that, under the Bankruptcy Act, firm creditors have
recourse to the remainder of the individual property after indi-
vidual creditors are paid. However, this argument is answered
in the following language: "But this is the only recourse such
creditors could have, and the same reasoning would more co-
gently persuade that the bankruptcy of an individual or of a
partnership would draw into the court of bankruptcy for adjudi-
cation all the property of indorsers and sureties of the bank-
rupts, for the creditors of such bankrupt may always have re-
course to the property of their sureties." This argument may
have its fallacies, but it indicates the answer to the contentions
of the followers of the other doctrine. The court continues by
saying that the Federal Bankruptcy Act recognizes partnerships
as entities. Since a partnership is a distinct entity separate from
the individuals who compose it, and since its property and its
debts are separate from the property and debts of the indi-
viduals, it must be insolvent under the Act when the aggregate
of its property is not sufficient to pay its debts.
Each rule is supported by a decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States. Francis v. McNeai12 upholds Vaccaro v.
Bank, supra, and Bank v. Bear, supra, in effect substantiates
In re Bertenshaw, supra. Although these cases in their reason-
ing support contrary doctrines as to the entity theory their re-
sults do not conflict and they are both law today.13 Francis v.
McNeal cites Vaccaro v. Bank and recognizes that the latter con-
flicts with the Bertenshaw case. Holmes, J., in Francis v. Mc-
Neal closes his opinion by expressly overruling those parts of
In re Bertenshaw which are inconsistent with the Vaccaro case.
The Supreme Court did not intend to repudiate the reasoning of
the Bertenshaw case on the question in hand, however, but over-
(1913), 228 U. S. 695, L. R. A. 1915 E. 706.
See note by writer, 14 ST. Louis L. REV. 57.
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ruled it on an entirely different point.14 The case of Bank v. Bear,
supports the holding of the Bertenshaw case, in that it recog-
nizes the entity theory.
Eminent text writers are also at odds on the subject. Rem-
ington,1 writes as follows: "A partnership is not to be deemed
insolvent unless the aggregate of all of its own property, to-
gether with all the individual property of its members in excess
of their respective individual indebtedness, is less than its lia-
bilities." He cites but two cases to verify his view.
Collier says,8 "In determining the question of insolvency the
individual property of the partners should be considered. Where
the assets of a partnership, together with the individual proper-
ties of each partner, exceed their liabilities, the partnership is
not insolvent. It has been well said that this principle is at
variance with the universal doctrine that under the present
bankruptcy act a partnership is a legal entity, separate from the
partners who compose it. But it is now well settled by the
weight of authority that if the act of bankruptcy charged is one
involving insolvency, the individual property of the partners
must be combined with the property of the partnership in de-
termining the insolvency of the partnership; and that a partner-
ship is not bankrupt so long as one of the members who compose
it is individually solvent." Collier here at least recognizes the
existence of the other rule.
Mechem- says, "The United States Bankruptcy Act of 1898
does undoubtedly to a limited extent treat the partnership as an
entity, but the somewhat extreme views, as to the effect of this
statute, announced by some of the circuit and district courts
have been disapproved by the United States Supreme Court."
Here again the other view is given recognition.
Burdick favors the view of the Bertenshaw case, saying", that
to permit a partnership to be adjudged bankrupt when one or
more of the partners is solvent gives full effect to the entity
theory of partnership, which theory is clearly provided for by
the Federal Bankruptcy Act.
So stand the authorities. Ultimately the Federal courts will
have to decide either to retain the old or to adopt the new con-
" Horner v. Hamner (1918), 249 F. 134. In this case the court quotes a
clause from In re Bertenshaw, upholding the entity theory of the partner-
ship with its consequent results. Of this the court says, "We are not inad-
vertent to the language found in the concluding sentence of the opinion of
Mr. Justice Holmes in Francis v. McNeal, but do not think it effects the
clause quoted-."
Remington, BANKRUPTCY (2d Ed.) Sec. 1348.
Collier, BANKRUPTCY (12th Ed.) p. 173.
"Mechem, ELEMENTS OF PARTNERSHIP (2d Ed.) p. 11.
"Burdick, PARTNERSHIP (2d Ed.) p. 306. Also see note by Burdick,
"Some Judicial Myths," 22 HARv. L. Rav. 393, 1. c. 397.
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ception. The old idea is still the weight of authority, and is
backed by the non-entity theory of the common law and by the
argument that Congress did not intend to cut off the common law
liability of partners by passing the bankruptcy act. But these
arguments may be met by others. The common law is con-
stantly changing and adapting itself to modern conditions. The
modern trend is for stability of business, one proof of this being
the extraordinary growth of corporate business. Even the slow
moving common law, depending on stare decisis, a system which
tends to impede progress rather than to encourage it, has weak-
ened to recognize joint stock companies and Massachusetts
Trusts. Why then should not the common law give a little more
in the face of a Federal Statute which clearly provides for a
partnership entity?
The purpose of this article is not to advance any new and
startling development of the law nor to upset certain fundamen-
tals of the common law, but merely to bring out the fact that
such a change as herein suggested is possible under the Federal
Bankruptcy Act. The whole idea of firm insolvency and bank-
ruptcy while one of the partners is totally solvent, presents an
anomaly-the bankruptcy of a firm which is able to pay its
creditors one hundred per cent of their claims.19 The theory is
a new one and in order to have it function properly, a radical
change in the common law of partnership, i. e., the abolition of
the partners' personal liability for firm debts, is necessary. The
common law is perhaps not ready for such a deviation from its
traditional view, and today the doctrine that a partnership is
an entity in bankruptcy is probably too far out of accord with it.
If so, it cannot be pushed to the limit suggested.
STANLEY WEISS, '29.
SURVIVAL OF CAUSES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND
RELATED WRONGS IN MISSOURI
Although it is important to know the common law on a sub-ject such as the survival of actions, it is equally important to
know how far that law has been superseded by statutes andjudicial interpretations of those statutes in a particular jurisdic-
tion. It is here proposed to consider briefly the Missouri law as
to the survival of causes of action for personal injuries not re-
sulting in death and of related causes. At common law, of
course, the doctrine was that the death of either the injured
party or the wrongdoer ended the matter, or, as it was then ex-
pressed, "actio personalis moritur cum persona." This common
law rule is in effect unless changed by statute.
" Incidentally this would open the Federal courts to suitors who desired
to stay out of the state courts and give them full satisfaction in the Federal
courts through the machinery of bankruptcy.
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